Ethics and Police Management: The Impact of Leadership Style on Misconduct by Senior Police Leaders in the United Kingdom (UK) and Australia

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Abstract
Serious misconduct by senior police leaders can negatively impact the public's trust in the police in two ways. Firstly, by failing to meet the more obvious expectations of leading by example, misconduct by police leaders are likely to bring institutional damage to the police (Holmes, 2010). Secondly, by the nature of any misconduct which appears to attack those whom they are tasked with protecting, police leaders may project a negative organisational image with more sinister overtones (Alpert & Noble 2009, p. 8). Public disquiet is likely to be considerable when police are found to be breaching the unwritten social contract of democratic policing and effectively showing contempt for democracy itself (Brewer & Brewer, 1994). This paper contends that while ethical behaviour amongst front line officers is crucial to maintaining public confidence, evidence of a chief officer's corrupt or unethical conduct may ultimately be more corrosive because of the implied betrayal of values and trust by the leader. The public impact of unethical practice by leaders versus that of front line police corruption cannot be easily measured through empirical data analysis. Surveys concerning trust and/or confidence in the police often harvest a range of responses against differing contexts (Allen, 2006; Cao, Frank & Cullen, 1996; Skogan,1994). This study focuses on the theoretical discussion surrounding the impact of deviant police leadership and its potential damage to police institutions in United Kingdom (UK) and Australia.
Key words: Police management, ethics, police misconduct, police corruption, leadership.

1. Introduction

Much of the research and discourse about police ethics focuses on the ethical standards of front line police officers, given the amount of discretionary power potentially wielded by every constable of police (Roebuck and Barker, 1974; Punch, 1985). Police organisational structures usually dictate that chief officers or senior leaders have little contact with the public on a regular basis and practically none in the direct execution of police powers (Geller, 1985). Conversely, the majority of police officers operate at or near the point of public interaction, with its attendant opportunities for corruption. It is therefore understandable that much of the police ethics debate centres on this day-to-day police-public interface and the opportunities for behaviour which breaches the public trust (Bevan, 1990; Dean et al. 2010).

By examining police ethics from a different perspective, the notion is advanced, that gross misconduct or severely unethical behaviour by police leaders may result in even deeper enduring damage to the public standing of the police as a trusted institution, when compared with typified corruption of front line policing. This study contends that while ethical behaviour amongst front line officers is crucial to maintaining public confidence, evidence of a chief officer's corrupt or unethical conduct may ultimately be more corrosive because of the implied betrayal of values and trust by the leader. The public impact of unethical practice by leaders versus that of front line police corruption cannot be easily measured through empirical data. Surveys concerning trust and/or confidence in the police often harvest a range of responses against differing contexts (Allen, 2006; Cao, Frank & Cullen, 1996; Skogan,1994). Because of the uncertainties in linking empirical data derived from public survey responses to specific incidents involving police, this study will focus on a theoretical discussion surrounding the impact of deviant police leadership from the perspective of potential damage to the police institution.

Serious misconduct by senior police leaders may damage the public's trust in the police in two ways. Firstly, by failing to meet the more obvious expectations of leading by example, errant police leaders are likely to bring institutional damage to the police (Holmes, 2010). Secondly, by the nature of any misconduct which appears to attack those whom they are tasked with protecting, police leaders may project a negative organizational image with more sinister overtones (Alpert & Noble 2009, p. 8). Public disquiet is likely to be considerable when police are discovered to be breaching the unwritten social contract of democratic policing and effectively showing contempt for democracy itself (Brewer & Brewer, 1994).

2. Approach

This paper examines the issue of corrupt or unethical police leadership in Australia and the United kingdom (UK) and the implications for public image and trust, noting theoretical links to management styles. Given the focus of this paper, the many typologies of police corruption will not be catalogued or discussed in depth. Instead, the nature of corrupt and/or unethical conduct most likely to be engaged in by police leaders is examined and identified against motivational and other contributing factors such as operating environments and the pressures of personal contractual obligations and performance objectives.

The political dimension of a police leader's role is identified and discussed as a major potential factor in the fostering of unethical or corrupt practices by police leaders. A literature review on police leadership style surveys is limited to a comparison of Machiavellian and transformational approaches to leadership. The results of these surveys are discussed from the perspective of motivation, mindset and leadership culture.

This study's central contention is that the adoption of certain management styles may also be a major contributing factor to misconduct by police leaders. One in particular (the Machiavellian management style) is discussed in the context of global usage of the term 'Machiavellian' and its commonly understood meanings. This management style is discussed both in the context of its positive contribution to the successful stewardship of police organizations and evidence suggesting its potential to contribute to unethical or criminal behaviour by police leaders. The latter is illustrated through the presentation of three distinct case studies, each concerning gross misconduct and/or criminal activity of police leaders in events which have attracted considerable publicity and community reaction as a result.

Three notable instances of high level corruption and/or official misconduct involving police leaders were selected as case studies against the following criteria:-

i)   Each case studied should have occurred within the context of policing in a modern developed democracy rather than in the developing world. As it is the intention to illustrate links between Machiavellian leadership and misconduct, the many other causative factors for police corruption in developing world may serve to skew the role of management style in this behaviour (Bardhan,1997).

ii)   Each case should illustrate prolonged, deliberate actions of police chiefs which amount to official misconduct or criminal activity, personally engaged in by the individuals concerned. This is distinct from the more common allegations sometimes leveled against police leaders namely; ignoring the misconduct of others (Williams, 2002).

iii) Each case should involve the engagement of Machiavellian practices by the individual(s) concerned, that is to say behaviour which incorporates a high degree of scheming, manipulation and deceit in a overwhelmingly negative dimension.

iv)   Each case should involve a different personal motivation for the crimes committed or unethical behaviour demonstrated, to illustrate a range of circumstances in which police leaders have crossed the line into Machiavellianism to the public's detriment.

The individual cases are examined in the context of causal factors and ingredients before analyzing theoretically the resulting levels of institutional damage to the police in terms of public trust and confidence. The cases are then compared and contrasted to identify key similarities and distinctions.

With particular reference to the last case study examined, a brief review of the literature is included in relation to the stressors commonly associated with police leadership. Some examples of how police leaders can react to these pressures is included in this segment, particularly from the perspective of damage control, which was a key motivating factor in one of the selected case studies.

In conclusion, a fundamental question is identified for further research. That is, whether gross misconduct or criminal activity committed by police leaders and revealed to the community can ultimately be more

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damaging to the police-public relationship than the type of opportunistic, low-level corruption which some police engage in from time to time in their daily interaction with the public.

3. Discussion
Identifying the nature of Misconduct by Police Leaders
Existing research encompasses several definitions of police corruption, commonly involving elements of deviance in the form of acts or omissions for gain or advantage (Roebuck and Barker 1974; Kleinig 1996; Punch 2000; Porter and Warrender 2009). Punch's (2000) definition described police corruption as either opportunistic crime of police on the front line or misconduct or corruption committed in a so-called noble cause. Skogan and Meares (2004) suggested that types of corruption can be categorised according to the intention. Corruption may be carried out for personal gain, but may also involve organisational gain, i.e. to secure convictions or other favourable outcomes.

The concept of corruption for organizational gain is perhaps the most relevant to this paper, given its focus on deviant and/or unethical behaviour by police leaders. Klockars (1985b, p.22) described this activity as 'the use of dirty means to achieve legitimate ends'. It is important at this point to distinguish misconduct for organisational gain from what is sometimes referred to as noble cause corruption (Harrison,1999; Crank & Caldero, 2010), although linkages between the two clearly exist. Organizational culture may also contribute to corruption amongst police leaders (Sherman, 1979). The type of corrupt behaviours discussed in this study typically (but not exclusively) involve cover-ups of systemic corruption (Brereton & Ede,1996), media manipulation and the conduct of misinformation campaigns (Scraton, 1999) or quasi-political activities for personal gain, which are ultimately to the public's detriment (Dodd, 2013).

3.1 Police Leadership and the Political Dimension
Police chiefs are inherently political appointments (Reiner and Newburn, 2000; Stenning, 2011). Despite a notional adherence to the separation of powers doctrine in the appointment and functioning of police chiefs in Britain and Australia, politics has always played a significant role in who leads the police and how they do it (Finnane, 1990). While this political influence is sometimes subtle, its presence in decision making at the top of policing, most obviously at the interface between chief officer and police minister is undeniable (Reiner, 2010a).

The stewardship of a major institution such as the police will always be a role steeped in politics. Stenning (2011, p. 3) notes that the ultimate responsibility for ensuring public safety and security lies with the people's representatives, specifically the Home Minister (UK) or equivalent, depending on the jurisdiction. The police are merely the executors of this task. This binds the police and political executive together in the common task of keeping society safe. Defining what is legitimate supervision of the police by the body politic and what is undue interference and influence is a moot point (Stenning, 2011).

In Britain, and less so in Australia, the mechanisms for appointment and accountability of police leaders have traditionally included a symbolic buffer of independence from government, however superficial this may be under further examination (Manning, 1974, Brusten, 1982). In fact, the oft-described independence of the police may be something of an illusion. Beare (2005) argues that society's traditional belief in the rhetoric surrounding the independence of policing may be based upon false assumptions. Newburn (2011) observed that much of the confusion comes from the idea of operational independence, a vague and little understood principle in British policing.

The notion is supported by some legal judgments, notably Lord Denning's 1968 observation that the chief constable is answerable to the law and to the law alone and from legislation which makes chief constables responsible for the direction and control of their forces. While formal instruments exist which buttress this independence, much of its support as a concept comes from the police themselves. For example, Reiner (2000) observed:

> *"Most police officers stoutly maintain that policing and politics don't mix. …it was an important part of the legitimating of the British police in the face of initial opposition that they were non-partisan".*

Before adding that the realities of the police-societal relationship are somewhat different:

> *…This notion of the political neutrality or independence of the police cannot withstand serious consideration. It rests on an untenably narrow conception of 'the political'… In a broader sense, all*

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> *relationships, which have a power dimension, are political. Policing is inherently and inescapably political in that sense."(Reiner, 2000 p. 8-9).*

Therefore, it can be argued that the independence of the police has been overstated. For example, until the advent of the (UK) Police Crime Commissioners (PCCs) in 2012, the system of control and accountability in England and Wales was known as the tripartite structure of police accountability which supposedly rested on the separation of powers. The Police Reform Act 2002 (UK) distributed oversight between the Home Office, the local police authority, and the chief constable of the force (Wakefield and Fleming, 2009). Central government is represented by the Home Office which dictates national policing policy (Stenning, 2009).

In light of this, it is difficult to view a police chief's role as anything other than political. The adoption of elected PCCs from 2012 can only further politicize their role. Sampson (2012) observed that the previous clear distinction between the electoral nexus with local policing in the United States and that of England and Wales was now defunct. Other observers (Rogers & Gravelle, 2012; Mawby & Smith, 2013) have cautioned that experience from other countries suggests that there are inherent dangers in making the police democratically rather than bureaucratically, accountable.

In a wider examination of the police-politics relationship, Reiner (2010b) acknowledged the founding principals of Peelian traditions of policing by consent and its theoretical depoliticisation. However, in summarizing the last thirty years of the relationship between the British Government of either persuasion and the police, Reiner (2010b) noted the growing political voice of the latter. This new political voice of the police has led to tensions between police and government on a range of issues, when opposition to official policy has been demonstrated (Newburn, 2012).

The political element to a police chief's role is also unavoidable against a backdrop of rapid societal change. A constantly changing world will ensure legislators increasingly enter controversial areas of policymaking effecting morality or private values (Hunter, 1991; Meier, 1994; Mooney, 2001). By virtue of their high public profile, police chiefs are often obligated to give their view on a range of issues effecting community safety, personal freedoms, acceptable standards of public behaviour and the like (Butler, 2000).

3.2 Surveys of Police Management Styles: A Review of The Literature

Kapla (2005) observed that there are arguably few agency executive positions in government that possess the amount of discretion and autonomy given to police chiefs, a view supported by Hunt & Magenau (1993). An examination of the literature suggests that behaviour amongst those in leadership varies across individuals and organizations, resulting in leaders being categorized by their individual leadership qualities and styles (Hitt, 1990; Girodo, 1998; Krimmel & Lindenmuth, 2001). This review of the literature focused on two leadership styles amongst a range first constructed by Hitt (1990), namely Machiavellian, and transformational, with particular emphasis on the former. In general, transformational leadership style appears to be regarded more positively by management survey respondents (Dobby et al., 2004: Mastrovski, 2004) when compared to the Machiavellian approach and has been positively associated with fighting corruption and supporting reform (Mastrofski, 2004).

Girodo's (1998) survey of chief executive officers of police departments from around the world assessed variants in leadership influence over subordinates in police institutions. Girodo further interpreted Hitt's (1990) systems of leadership but used only three systems for the survey. According to Girodo's (1998) survey, the Machiavellian leaders reported themselves to possess manipulative personality traits with a means-end management philosophy, that is to say, the means are justified by the ends. The transformational leaders saw themselves as being considerate, charismatic, and personable. However, in the realm of administrative management, Girodo (1998) observed:

> *"...the Machiavellian style was the most and the transformational style the least preferred by managers working in administration. Police managers indicate that this area of responsibility is best handled with....power and control tactics" (Girodo, 1998 p. 426).*

Most of the police supervisors responding to Girodo's survey fell into the Machiavellian framework. This is noteworthy, as a substantial percentage of municipal leaders who responded to the survey also placed their police chief's management style in the Machiavellian category (Girodo, 1998 p. 429).

Krimmel and Lindenmuth (2001) examined the attitudes of municipal managers regarding their police chiefs' performance and leadership styles. They found that being hired from outside the department resulted in

4

being rated lower in performance and leadership by their managers, and that being an outsider was associated with the Machiavellian (manipulative) leadership style. However, Krimmel and Lindenmuth (2001) cautioned that the latter may be indicative of animosity between the already existing police community and the police newcomer. In light of this research, it can be theorised that the newly appointed outsider may well be persuaded to adopt Machiavellian tactics to secure their position at the top of their new organisation, and this may, in time be detected by their peers and managers.

Kapla (2005) analysed a mail survey of 415 local Wisconsin police chiefs to determine leadership style which found that of four leadership styles identified, Machiavellian was the least preferred amongst police managers in the middle ranks. However, Kapla found that managers working in upper level administrative positions preferred to adopt a Machiavellian style. According to Girodo (1990) this indicates that most upper-level managers prefer using strategic control tactics for administering personnel.

Kapla's research (2005, p. 78) found that the Machiavellian chief has a preference for manipulation to accomplish tasks, but identified negative associations with this management approach. In conclusion, Kapla (2009, p. 105) found that overall, the Machiavellian style is least preferred among police chiefs, an outcome in contradiction to Girodo's (1998) survey of police managers conducted within the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

Gutterman's (1970) study posited that *"Machiavellianism refers to an amoral, manipulative attitude toward other individuals, combined with a cynical view of men's motives and their character"*. This study theorised that being hired from outside the organisation may place a police chief at disadvantage because the successful external candidate has not had the opportunity of proving themself as successful and deserving of the Chief's role (Gutterman, 1970 p. 3). This is also broadly in keeping with the findings of Krimmel and Lindenmuth (2001).

A UK Home Office study (Dobby et al., 2004) involving a survey of 1,066 police officers, found a strong correlation between subordinates' perceptions of their line managers' displays of transformational leadership (particularly showing genuine concern for others' well-being and development) and a belief that their line managers act in a manner that enables them to achieve beyond their expectations. This is yet further evidence of the positive association of the transformational leadership style in modern policing.

The dynamic nature of police management dictates that no one management approach should be set in stone. Campbell and Kodz (2011) concluded that policing requires an approach to leadership that differs to other sectors. In addition to capabilities of command and control, effective police leaders must also demonstrate the ability to cultivate participative and supportive management styles and behaviours (Campbell and Kodz, 2011).

An overall observation of the literature suggests that the Machiavellian leadership style, though not desirable or appropriate in many leadership contexts, may, in fact play an important part in allowing police chiefs to maintain knowledge and control over their organisations, particularly in a hostile operating environment. The crucial ethical debate surrounds the degree and extent of Machiavellian behaviour engaged in and to what purpose.

3.3 Machiavellian Leadership and The Will To Prevail

In a global referencing context, the term 'Machiavellian' attracts negative connotations. Mention of the word often inspires thoughts of scheming, deceit, disloyalty and manipulation. It is derived from the writings of Niccolò di Machiavelli (1469 – 1527) a fifteenth century Italian historian, politician, diplomat, philosopher and humanist. Machiavelli's most significant work was *The Prince*, essentially a manual to acquiring and keeping political power. In this, Machiavelli outlined his thoughts on the qualities of those under charge of the leader:-

> *"Whether it be better to be loved than feared or feared than loved?... it is much safer to be feared than loved. Men ... are ungrateful, fickle, false, cowardly, covetous, and as long as you succeed they are yours entirely; they will offer you their blood, property, life and children, as is said above, when the need is far distant; but when it approaches they turn against you... but fear preserves you by a dread of punishment which never fails". (Machiavelli, The Prince, Chapter XVII).*

While Machiavelli's expression is cynical and brutal in parts there is an undeniable pragmatism in his thoughts on leadership. In reality, successful police leaders will always need to possess or quickly acquire sound political acumen in order to negotiate relationships both internal and external to their organizations (Sanow, 2012). Just where actions based upon astute political judgment can be judged as 'Machiavellian' in a

negative sense is open to interpretation in the ethics debate. However, it can be argued that the Machiavellian leadership style has both positive and negative implications for police leadership.

Police leaders using organisational knowledge, including strengths and weaknesses of individuals to bolster their leadership position is not necessarily unethical; leaders in all organisational spheres spend much of their efforts in consolidating their power, often by ensuring high performance and output which reflects on their leadership, sometimes by position taking and posturing in a political landscape of one form or another (Siegal, 2000, Gaines & Miller, 2010).

Some commentators have taken the concept further. Sanow (2012) espouses that Machiavellian philosophy should be seriously considered for adoption by everyone in a police leadership position facing challenges such as a short tenure in which to perform and as an external appointee, gaining organisational support and approval. Management research in this area clearly acknowledges Machiavellianism as an accepted, if not welcome leadership style (Hanna, 1987; Krimmel & Lindenmuth, 2001; Johnson & Cox, 2004; Kapla, 2005)

One view of Sanow's (2012) advice to potential police leaders is that it implies that the manipulation of stakeholders to achieve the objectives is a desirable trait amongst police chiefs. An alternative view is that as a police chief's performance is ultimately assessed against outcomes, the ends justify the means perspective is likely to be the dominant perspective in the leader's efforts to survive and prosper in this role. Krimmel and Lindenmuth (2001, p. 481), using an animal analogy, argued that a police chief must at all times be able to outwit the individuals who also seek the top position. In the same vein, Byrne and Whiten (1988) observed:-

> *"Social interaction is like a game of chess. The players must be capable of forward planning so that they can remain in a position of power regardless of the moves of the other player" (Byrne and Whiten, 1988 p. 19).*

Moreover, policing organisations can sometimes collectively benefit from the Machiavellian leadership style, particularly when political opportunities are taken to grow the organisation in size, capability and resources, and/or improve its public standing and profile (Fleming & Hall, 2008; Hameiri, 2009). However, the adoption of an aggressively Machiavellian leadership style can also be interpreted as a contributing factor in some highly publicised serious cases of unethical behaviour by police leaders over the last thirty years. Three significant instances have been identified as illustrative of Machiavellian conduct in the negative sense, when police leaders have betrayed public trust for their own personal motives.

3.4 Case Study 1: Lewis and the Fitzgerald Inquiry (Queensland, Australia)

The political relationship between police and government has at times been the incubator of corrupt and unethical behavior in police leaders. Some have sought to use cultural bonds with and strong support from the government of the day to insulate themselves from accountability.

In Australia, the Fitzgerald Inquiry of 1989 unearthed evidence of a strong link between corruption in government and that of the leadership of the Queensland police over a long period of time in the 1970 -80s. That widespread culture of corruption in turn filtered down to a sizeable group of officers on the front line, ultimately culminating in a Royal Commission of Inquiry followed by an extended period of police reform from the top down in the 1990s (Fitzgerald, 1989). The public image of the Queensland Police Service (QPS) suffered accordingly for a decade or more. In a relatively recent essay on police reform, Queensland historian and Academic Ross Fitzgerald observed that the extraordinary revelations at the Fitzgerald inquiry between 1987 and 1989 shattered the public's confidence in the QPS (Fitzgerald, 2010 p. 1).

The corruption uncovered by the Hon. Justice Tony Fitzgerald in a 1989 Commission of Inquiry was entrenched and of long-standing. From the 1950s officers of the Queensland Police Licensing Branch had established a successful protection racket involving illegal gambling in return for payments from illegal bookmakers, prostitutes and operators of illegal gambling operations. Senior police were also paid by the Licensing Branch officers to head off any potential internal investigations. One police Commissioner, Ray Whitrod disrupted this activity for a period of time, but was ultimately undermined by the Queensland Police Union and the Premier. A senior member of this corrupt network, Terry Lewis, had established links with the Premier and subverted the efforts of Whitrod, who subsequently resigned (Fitzgerald, 1989, p. 43). Thereafter, Lewis and several senior officers perpetuated this corrupt activity for a number of years (Brereton & Ede,1996).

After Whitrod's departure, Lewis was appointed Commissioner and had also established the patronage of political heavy weights. The corruption was ongoing until print media and television exposition in the late 1980s forced the government to act. A Commission of Inquiry was established into the allegations of

corruption amongst both the police, and, separate corrupt relationships between politicians and developers. A key player in this corrupt network turned whistleblower, lead to a cascade of admissions by other corrupt officers (Fitzgerald, 1989 p. 43-44). The case of Lewis and the scale of corruption uncovered by the Fitzgerald Inquiry was remarkable, in being the first instance in modern times of a police Commissioner, in Britain or Australia being gaoled for corrupt conduct.

3.5 Case Study 2: Ali Dizaei and the Metropolitan Police
By way of comparison with Australia's Fitzgerald Inquiry, Holmes (2010) described how the most senior police officer to be convicted of corruption in the UK since the late-1970s was sentenced to four years' imprisonment in February 2010, for having attempted to frame an innocent man, in the officer's attempt to conceal abuses of office. Former Metropolitan Police commander Ali Dizaei was found guilty of making false statements about an incident that was alleged to have occurred in July 2008, but that was deemed by a jury not to have taken place (Holmes, 2010 p. 7).

On 16 May 2011, the conviction of Dizaei was quashed and a retrial was ordered by the Court of Appeal. Following the appeal hearing, Dizaei was reinstated to the force but remained suspended. On 10 January 2012, Dizaei underwent a retrial at Southwark Crown Court in relation to the same matters and on 13 February 2012 was found guilty

(IPCC 2012, p. 4). Following Dizaei's final conviction, the head of Scotland Yard admitted that the case had damaged the reputation of the police, while the Chair of the Independent Police Complaints Commission reportedly remarked: *'The greatest threat to the reputation of the police service is criminals in uniform like Dizaei'* (Holmes, 2010 p. 9).

As one of few very senior British police officers of Asian origin, Dizaei courted controversy throughout his career, often making reference to his ethnic Iranian background as the grounds for instances of supposed unfair discrimination against him and others. In fact, the evidence ultimately revealed that Dizaei had engaged in criminal activity while simultaneously resist at systems of police accountability on the claimed basis of racial discrimination (Dodd, 2010; Holmes, 2010).

It can be argued that Dizaei thrived on weaknesses in the command and control systems amongst the top echelons of the Metropolitan Police, which were clearly not designed to anticipate criminally corrupt conduct by officers so senior in rank. Dizaei manipulated this system for a number of years, countering every serious allegation against him with claims of his own, usually based around some element of racial discrimination (Holmes, 2010, p. 9).

Dizaei's capability for publication of his struggles and for engendering support for his defence appears extraordinary. For example, long before his criminal conviction, Kennedy & Mcqueen (2007, p. 10) observed that the support extended by British intellectuals to Dizaei in his defence of corruption allegations made by the Metropolitan Police was considerable, but remarked that the extent of the support shown to an officer holding a law degree and a PhD in race relations seemed to be seldom replicated for rank-and-file police facing similar charges.

On 15 May 2012, The Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) advised that Dizaei had been dismissed from the Metropolitan Police without notice following a conviction for perverting the course of justice and misconduct in public office in February 2012. The tribunal found that the misconduct charge brought against Dizaei proven and also that the nature of his convictions involved proof of his dishonest conduct, a lack of integrity and discreditable conduct. Speaking on this finding, IPCC Deputy Chair Deborah Glass, said:-

> *"Ali Dizaei's dismissal from the Metropolitan Police Service was the right and inevitable outcome following his conviction, a second time, for serious criminal offences…Many will wonder how Mr Dizaei was able to rise to the very senior rank of commander. The Metropolitan Police Service needs to ensure that never again is its reputation so badly damaged by the acts of one of its most senior officers." (IPCC, 2012 http://www.ipcc.gov.uk/news/dismissal-former-mps-commander-ali-dizaei-and-publication-ipcc-report)*

3.6 The 'Machiavellian' Practices of Lewis and Dizaei Compared and Contrasted
The case studies of Lewis and Dizaei, although separated by twenty years and 12,000 miles, have some striking similarities. Both invoke a picture of a senior police leader within a large policing organisation who

has lost its way, as demonstrated by senior police leadership abusing its power over a significant period of time. Both police leaders can be said to have employed a high degree of Machiavellian behaviour in the conduct of their crimes and through careful strategising to evade detection for a significant period of time.

Where the Lewis and Dizaei cases differ is in the context of their policing environments. Lewis' behaviour was incubated in an ethically weak Queensland Police Force over many years, in an environment where such behaviour was tacitly encouraged by the government of the day, itself largely corrupt (Fitzgerald, 1989). The public had become broadly aware of this malpractice from government down. As Shultz (2008) noted, even prior to the Fitzgerald Inquiry, Queensland had become to be seen by many Australians as:

> *"…an embarrassing national joke — simply the product of police corruption, tawdry sex, draconian regulations and incompetent politicians … a cynical abuse of power seeped like summer sweat from the pores of the body politic, tainting all those who came in contact with it." (Shultz, 2008, p.11).*

Thus, in such an environment, it cannot have been difficult for Lewis to adopt aggressive Machiavellian tactics in protecting his corrupt networks and suppressing those not involved in the corruption or seeking reform, when much of the Queensland Legislative were conducting themselves in a similar way. By contrast, Dizaei appears to have used differing, but no less Machiavellian tactics in surviving a highly controversial career, until his gaoling in 2010, mainly by using the media as a channel of protest and counter-attack. There is no suggestion that Dizaei's misconduct was incubated in a corrupt environment. Instead, evidence in the public domain points to true Machiavellianism conducted by a lone, skilful leader, using political correctness and race as a powerful weapon.

The cases of Lewis and Dizaei have both been widely reported within their respective communities, particularly through open judicial proceedings. In the case of the former, this occurred during evidence adduced in the Fitzgerald Inquiry public hearings and subsequent criminal trials of the 1980s and 90s; the public heard sensational details of widespread police and government corruption. In the case of Dizaei, much evidence of his behaviour was revealed to the public in Crown Court hearings of 2010 and 2012 and subsequent media reporting.

The obvious and initial questions that may arise in the mind of any spectator to these proceedings might concern organizational weakness or worse, complicity, in the face of each police chief's misconduct. The public may question whether others of senior rank were involved and why the police force was unable or unwilling to stop the activity (Tiffen, 2004). From these very fundamental questions that might reasonably be asked by the community, it can be posited that damage to the public image of policing could potentially be far greater from the cases cited, than, say, a singular, minor act of dishonesty by a constable on the street.

As established earlier, much theory and research exists on the corruption of rank-and-file police and on methods to combat this activity. However, there is less discussion in the police-ethics arena on measures of oversight and accountability needed to ensure senior police leaders adhere to the high ethical standards expected of their role. It is unreasonable to expect middle or lower ranking police officers to discharge this role; seniority brings with it power, leverage and the ability to conceal one's activities. This task can only reasonably be fulfilled by government, through its supervisory mechanisms and oversight committees such as Police Integrity Commissions (PICs) and Independent Commissions Against Corruption (ICACs).

Ultimately, the standard and tone of police leadership will be set by government. According to Quah's (2006) research into anti-corruption measures in Singapore, that State's success in mitigating police corruption is due to, amongst other things, political will and the commitment of the government to combat corruption. Quah (2006) cites this as the single most important variable in the success rate of anti-corruption measures, an ingredient that appears to have been missing in Queensland, until the late 1980s and the emergence of the Criminal Justice Commission (CJC) and its successor; the Crime and Misconduct Commission (CMC).

3.7 Case Study 3: Hillsborough and Its Aftermath

In Britain, more contemporary examples of Machiavellian police leadership contributing to unethical conduct have been the subject of recent high-profile public debate. One such example is the renewed public focus in 2012 on the actions of police leadership during and in the aftermath of the Hillsborough tragedy, some thirty years ago.

The Hillsborough crowd control disaster occurred at a soccer stadium in Sheffield, South Yorkshire in 1989, leading to the death of ninety-six men, women, and children. The disaster let to a Home Office inquiry, a criminal investigation, compensation hearings, lengthy coronial inquests, a judicial review and private prosecutions. In 2012 an independent panel was established by government to review the material from

numerous inquiries, actions and hearings and draw coherent conclusions, to aid the public's understanding of what actually occurred (Report of the Hillsborough Independent Panel, 2012).

The Hillsborough Panel (2012, p. 24) found that following the tragedy, the South Yorkshire Police Federation, supported informally by the local Chief Constable, sought to develop and publicise a version of events that focused on several police officers' allegations of drunkenness, ticketless attendees and violence among a large number of Liverpool football fans that were in attendance. The inference was constructed that this behaviour contributed to the disaster, this account being widely propagated via the media. Yet, the Hillsborough Panel (20120 found that documents, television and CCTV coverage provided no evidence to support these allegations other than some isolated examples of abusive behaviour (Report of the Hillsborough Independent Panel, 2012 p. 34).

Scraton (1999) considered Hillsborough and its long-term aftermath in the framework of constructing the truth within social democracies when state institutions are accused of blame. Discussing how regimes of truth operate to protect and sustain the interests of the powerful. Scraton (1999, p. 24) concluded that the formal legal processes relating to Hillsborough were manipulated to hide the truth and deny justice to the bereaved. It could be argued that the Hillsborough tragedy is illustrative of senior police reacting to a threat arising from public pressure to get to the truth, by constructing their own version of the truth.

In analysing typologies of corruption, Porter and Warrender (2009, p. 25) contend that a theoretical category, referred to as situational response also exists, where the misconduct occurred as an outcome of being faced with a certain situation. This theoretical category of situational response can be applied to the very senior police officers named within the Hillsborough report as engaging in misinformation and distortion campaigns. Faced with a damning judgement of implied incompetence by their police force, and by association, themselves, they responded with sustained attempts to deflect blame onto others.

4. Police Leadership Stressors and Misconduct: Theoretical linkages

It may be instructive to examine the motivating factors, beyond personal survival, that may contribute to senior police adopting defensive, Machiavellian tactics which ultimately descend into unethical behaviour. It should be stated at the outset that the factors to be discussed in no way ameliorate or excuse individuals from corrupt conduct while in leadership, but may be contributing ingredients to such events unfolding.

The defensive mindset, perhaps incubated by the many pressures of the role of police chief, may be a strong contributor to instances when police leaders have engaged in unethical conduct in order to bolster their position against perceived hostile attacks, from both internal and external sources. Cynicism may naturally develop in this environment (Klockars, 1985b). The pressures brought to bear upon a police chief can not only alienate them, but can create personal problems for the individual and their families as well (Wexler 1995; Brown et al. 1996).

The position of police chief has been described as an impossible government job (Hargrove & Gildewell, 1990), as they face enormous challenges and responsibilities resulting in significant personal health problems and large turnover rates (Rainguet & Dodge, 2001). These factors may lead some police leaders to adopt a siege mentality and sometimes react with tactics which are questionable. Scrutiny from all angles is as never before, driven by the information age, media cycle and public expectation.

For example, in Britain, the political climate between government and police chiefs has changed remarkably in the past few years. London's Metropolitan Police currently has its third Commissioner in three years, prior leaders succumbing to scandal and claims of incompetence against a climate of phone hacking, journalists bribing police and questions about the handling of public disorder. Newburn (2011) noted that the introduction of directly elected PCCs has been met with police scepticism and hostility. Additionally, the 2011 riots and government concerns that the police response had been too slow and timid amplified tensions between the British government and the police (Newburn, 2011 p. 1). Thus a hostile operating environment, fostering defensive mindsets may develop amongst police chiefs.

Media scrutiny alone, with no suggestion of impropriety can now seemingly bring down a police chief. Greer and McLaughlan (2011) examined former Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) Commissioner Sir Ian Blair's trial by media and concluded that a sustained period of media attack in the British press established an image of Blair as a gaffe-prone Commissioner, destroying his credibility. They concluded that the subsequent resignation of Blair occurred largely because of attack journalism and the rising news media phenomenon of the politics of outrage (Greer & McLaughlan, 2011 p. 23).

This political and media pressure, combined with ever higher public expectation of service delivery and performance may contribute to a defensive posture being adopted by police leaders who are prone to this stance by personality type. It is argued that this pressured environment could encourage a defensive mindset of by all means necessary amongst those charged with police leadership, potentially leading to Machiavellian behaviour and unethical conduct.

Porter and Warrender (2009) argue that the concept of a perceived noble cause helps to convince a network of officers to engage in behaviour that they know is against the rules. The fact that officers are engaging in misconduct together suggests that they may be influencing each other, consciously through overt peer pressure or unconsciously by providing social support to each other. This noble cause could be as simple as a desire to protect the image and standing of the police service (Scraton, 1999).

Such behaviour can be linked to the well-researched phenomenon of groupthink in tightly cohesive policing groups (Steyn, De Vries & Meyer, 2004; Ammons, 2005). Groupthink is common under conditions of high stress, where people believe in their own morality, have high cohesiveness and where there is an absence of external audit. These conditions are particularly relevant to police officers who are under pressure to solve crimes (Sherman, 1985; Fleming & Lafferty, 2000). Rosenthal and Kouzmin (1991) argue that bureau-politics, where relevant agencies come together to address crisis management, serve to counteract groupthink tendencies, fostering a certain degree of openness. This approach may also facilitate democratic control of far-reaching crisis management policies (Rosenthal and Kouzmin,1991).

Documenting behaviour with some parallels to Hillsborough, Bovens et al. (1998) examined the police and politician's response to a policing policy fiasco in the Netherlands surrounding unethical practices of police in drug law enforcement. They analysed how policy elites may try to defend themselves in the different stages of the politics of blaming that may arise following some initial revelation about damages, deviance or other evidence of potential organizational or policy fiascos. At the time of combating negative public sentiment, elites in the police and government used basic elements of crisis management to deflect blame, using tactics such as: accusing the accuser, positive interpretation, reframing, combating causation and blaming the messenger (Bovens et al., 1998 p. 14).

Bovens et al. (1998) raise the question of whether the political response to policy fiascos by police and politicians is reduced to public relations spin and image management. They conclude that for those who fear the Machiavellian use of defensive tactics and arguments, there is some hope. The authors make a point pertinent to the central premise of this study; even the heavy use of media spin cannot hide the truth, provided the political system allows for enough checks and balances (Bovens et al., 1998 p. 18). Ultimately this has been evidenced by recent events concerning the Hillsborough tragedy, albeit the truth emerging some years after the initial event.

5. Conclusion: The Consequences of Corrupt Police Leadership

The three case studies discussed all involve examples of Machiavellian behaviour by police chiefs in the conduct of criminal (or in the case of Hillsborough, at least unethical) behaviour. Lewis' motives appear to be have been largely material, Dizaei's based on the maintenance of power and position and the Hillsborough officers' one of a misplaced noble cause in protecting the police (and their own) reputation.

The behaviours and actions of these senior police gave rise to widespread public reactions of negativity within their respective communities (Fitzgerald, 1989; Fitzgerald, 2010; Scraton, 2010). The resulting damage accruing from corruption of police leadership can be classified as twofold; that which is internal to the police organisation and that which is sustained by the police-public relationship. In a comparative study of police corruption, Holmes (2010, p. 6) contended that one of the most significant causes of the continuation and intensification of corruption among junior police officers is poor role-modelling from their seniors. Further, if police corruption is to be avoided, it is a logical imperative that senior police officers should set a good example. Taking this concept further, if front line police are aware of unethical behaviour or worse by their leaders, a message is transmitted to them about the tolerance and acceptability of such conduct (Holmes, 2010).

The second area of damage in terms of police-public relations has been alluded to in the context of fallout from the Fitzgerald Inquiry, the criminal trials of Lewis and Dizaei and the many public reports about the police response to the Hillsborough tragedy. The latter in particular appears to have alienated a sizable part

of the Merseyside Community (Scraton, 1999), leading to further mistrust of government and police in areas where, for a range of reasons, this already exists (Boland, 2008).

Community alienation is a high risk factor when considering the consequences of police corruption in terms of public reaction. Hough et al. (2010) note that police legitimacy is a powerful predictor of community compliance, even holding constant personal morality. The ways in which the police wield their authority in part generates their perceived legitimacy, and if they treat people unfairly, legitimacy suffers and people become cynical about human nature and legal systems of justice (Beetham, 1991).

While ethical behaviour amongst front line police officers is crucial to maintaining public legitimacy, evidence of a chief officer's corrupt or unethical conduct may, in certain environments be more corrosive, because of the implied betrayal of values and trust by a community leader. This is a theoretical position, as the impact of unethical practice by leaders versus that of street level, opportunistic police corruption cannot be easily determined through empirical data. Public surveys of trust and/or confidence in the police will often reflect the individual respondent's experiences and levels of awareness on the issues canvassed. Community surveys typically elicit a range of responses which may be influenced by specific issues and contexts, examples being police reform and modernisation (Allen, 2006), race relations (Cao, Frank & Cullen, 1996) and the nature and outcomes of personal contact with the police (Skogan,1994).

The other major variable in any such comparison is the extent of unethical or criminal conduct amongst front line police; if it is known or perceived to be rare or only occasional in occurrence, the community impact of corrupt conduct by police leaders may be more marked. If, on the other hand, a police organisation is regarded by its community as widely corrupt, it may come as no surprise that its leadership has similar traits (Verma, 1999).

Police corruption of any typology is corrosive to public trust, but an additional aggravating factor in the cases discussed may have been the Machiavellian approach taken by senior police in attacking the very community that they were supposed to be serving. Such behaviour, when exposed, brings with it an almost cast-iron guarantee of increased alienation of the community from those tasked with its protection. The question of whether this type of leadership corruption may ultimately be more damaging to public trust in the police than sporadic (as opposed to widespread) corrupt behaviour by rank-and-file police is worthy of further research.

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