

**BALANCE COLLABORATION IN DECENTRALIZATION OF FORESTRY AFFAIR IN
JAVA**

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Abstract

There are two paradigms on natural resources management, state based management and community based management. The first paradigm puts the government in a decisive position and centralized, while the public only as a supporting party. Instead the latter is a decentralized paradigm that puts community as main actors, and the government play on role as a facilitator and administrator for the activity. Those centralized and decentralized models of forest management, both equally lead to deforestation and social conflict. Therefore, it is necessary to use balance centered approach that puts the relationship of local government as a partner of the central government rather than its subordinate. This approach is based on collaboration among stakeholders, since one cannot replace the other, but need each other. So, its need to be supported and developed in proportional division of authority in forestry affair, in the form of balance collaboration among stakeholders by enhancing the role of local governments and communities with the guidance of the central government.

Key words: decentralization, division of authority, balance collaboration, forestry affair, communities

1. INTRODUCTION

Government and the communities are very concerned about the existence of the forest, since forest resources have uniqueness and strategic values. Forests have multiple values, such as economic, social, religious, and ecological values (Ros-Tonen, 2006; McCarthy, 2002; Hatch, 2005). The Indonesian forest tenure pattern during New Order Era was highly centralized (Resosudarmo, 2004; Webband Shivakoti, 2007). Governments determine how roles and access of the communities, local government and central government itself to forests and forest products. Law number 41 of 1999 on Forestry stated that the government takes care of the forest with aim to improve people's welfare, equality and sustainability. Those goals can be achieved by improving communities' capacity development and empowerment, in a participatory, equitable and environmentally-friendly so as to create social and economic resilience and resistance to due to external changes and ensure fair distribution of benefits and sustainability (Ministry of Forestry, 2013).

There are two paradigms in the management of natural forest resources, namely state-based forest management and community-based forest management. The first paradigm puts the government in a central and decisive position, while the second paradigm places the community as the main actor (Khakim, 2005). Centralist large-scale forest management tend to exploit massively and leave the risks and negative impact of over-exploitation to the community and the local (Kartodiharjo and Jhamtani, 2006). This is the model of forest management that encourage poverty and unsustainable ecologically (DFID, 1999), repressive (Nurjaya, 2005), eliminating the role of local communities, uncontrolled violations of the forest, and decreasing forest cover (Webb and Shivakoti, 2007).

In many countries, centralized forest resource management is becoming obsolete. Decentralization with all advantages in terms of participation, responsiveness, accessibility, accountability and conformity with the provisions of services to the public will, become a choice in public policy making (Cheema and Rondinelli, 2007; Mody, 2004; Balaquer-Coll, et al, 2009; Muluk, 2009). In those countries, especially in developing countries, the local government use to want to have a full autonomy. The degree of autonomy and control is very varied between countries, regions, and even between towns and villages. The more economically advanced and politically mature, local people want greater autonomy (Muttalib and Khan 1982).

Decentralization of natural resources management will give positive impact through: popular participation, encourage local accountability, improve local units' capacity, and central government can share cost and responsibilities. Besides, the common property regime managed by community showed better performance than the one run by government (Andersson, 2006; Suharjito, 2009). So, decentralization should be implemented on countries which have wide regional coverage and high heterogeneity of social preferences (Garcia-Valinas, 2007), but the decentralization of forestry affair will not work if the local whom receives that decentralization are not accountable (Ribot, Lund, Treue, 2010).

But the decentralized system itself is not without weakness. Some scholar believe that decentralization actually increase the administrative cost and hamper public services, because of the lack of human resources, financial and technical matter of local government (Prud'homme, 1995; Crook and Sverrisson, 2001; Balaquer-Coll, et al, 2009; Ekawati, 2013). It also does not guarantee to strengthen of local actors and institutions (Yonariza and Shivakoti, 2007). In various studies, decentralization of forest management has increased of illegal logging, conflict within communities, environmental degradation and deforestation. It has also increased abuse of authority by officials to get political backing and laying the way for the rent-seeking (Yasmi et al, 2005; Santoso, 2008; Ribot, Lund and Treue 2010; Teye, 2011). The pattern of forest decentralization in Indonesia after reformation era, encourage local governments to over-exploit the forest for increasing their local revenue in the form of *Pendapatan Asli Daerah* (Local own Source Revenue), or *Dana Alokasi Umum* (General Allocation Fund) and *Dana Alokasi Khusus* (Specific Allocation Fund) by issuing regulations or permits for the use of timber (Resosudarmo, 2003; Karyaatmadja et al., 2006; Fox et al., 2005). That local government paradigm leads to more massive exploitation of the forest.

Those fear of over-exploitation, cast doubt on the capability of the local government, and the increasing of horizontal conflict (Teye, 2011) made the Indonesian central government withdraw most of the authority on forestry affair that have decentralized and leaves small authority for local governments (Arnold, LL, 2008). That withdrawal can be argued, because mostly known that deforestation and forest degradation in Indonesia majority due to the massive expansion of oil palm and industrial tree plantations, huge scale of destructive and illegal logging (Pagiola, 2000; Rudel, 2007). In the earlier, prior to decentralization era, during the 1980s until the 1990s, in this heavily centralized system of government, Indonesia lost 19 million

hectares of forest and peat land (Hansen et al., 2009; Pagiola, 2000). This resulted in environmental degradation, including deforestation, floods, landslides, social conflict between local communities and resource extraction enterprises (Azis and Salim, 2005), and loss of biodiversity, (Aiken, 2004; Elliott, 2001; Yonekura et al., 2010). State forest management by the central government is not proving better than by the Local Government (Barr, C, et al., 2006).

The centralized management on state forest, which still exists recently in Indonesia, is in Java forest by Perum Perhutani (State-own Forest enterprise). The government delegates forest management in Java to Perum Perhutani in accordance with Government Regulation Number 72 of 2010. This regulation tends to be centralized. Centralized management of natural resources is more appropriate (Oentarto, et al., 2004) to create order and political stability (Agustino, 2011) with the consideration of the scale and responsibility of public services, while the local government used to promote the economic value and short-term priority on forests over the long-term national interests (Degrassi 2003 in Colfer and Capistrano [Eds], 2006). However, centralization usually have limitations in huge coverage area (Nurrochmat, 2005b) and gives impact on economic disparity, the gap among region and the oligarchy of power (Agustino, 2011).

This centralized monoculture forest management by Perum Perhutani in Java was replicated in the forest outside Java Island. The replication without considering any Javanese social history (Peluso, 1992), brought the alienation of local communities from accessing forest resources, social conflicts between communities (Mary, 2013) and deforestation (Peluso, 1992; ARuPA, 2013) on forest management pattern in those islands outside Java. Forest management should be comprehensive. If forests solely for ecological conservation and exclude public interest from it, the social conflict and poverty of the communities will increase (Swiderska, et al., 2012). Most of conflict between communities and forest enterprises is a conflict to fight over the rights to control forest area and access to its resources (Kompas.com, November 17, 2011 and January 10, 2013; ARuPA, 2013; HuMa, 2013).

The lacks of access to forest resources and land for agriculture also lead to greater poverty to villagers who live near or inside the forest (Mary, 2013). Those lacks make the villagers which are socially, culturally and physically dependent on the forest, to be alienated from the environment in which they grew. This situation brings communities distrust to Perum Perhutani (Maryudi and Krott, 2012) as state-own forest company. When forest management fails to alleviate poverty among forest communities, the policy of forestry affair should be directed to develop communities and villagers which live around or inside the forest, through the distribution of forest benefits which more equitable, more accountable, and more obey rules of law (Khakim, 2005; Nurrochmat, 2005a; Kartodiharjo and Jhamtani, 2006). The determination of centralized or decentralized model of division of authority on forestry affair is depending on whom the authority was granted. Division of authority on forestry affair and forest management must synergize each other. Forest resources should be managed jointly by state, private and public, in accordance with their respective responsibilities (Agrawal and Ostrom, 2007; Mogoi, et al., 2012). Intergovernmental relationship between local and central government according Muttalib and Khan (1982) can be divided into three approaches namely: 1) local government centered approaches, 2) service centered approaches, and 3) balance centered approaches.

The third approaches have some assumptions such as: 1) effective services through the strengthening and adjustment of local government institutions, so that structure, resources and responsibilities may sufficient for democracy and good services; 2) put local and central government as partners for achieving peoples welfare; 3) if local government implement a program, central government provides assessment, technical, and financial support, and if the central government do the implementation, the local government gives information and feedback for the program. In general, the relationship between governments at different levels should no longer hierarchical superior and subordinate, but based on collaboration between them, because one cannot replace the other but need each other (Muttalib and Khan, 1982).

In case of forestry, that approach emphasizes a balance between the roles of stakeholders and encourage participation. Forest resources adequacy used to be less than needed, this condition encourages conflict between users. So, participatory resources management is important in order to manage forests properly. In a large area with a growing population, participation becomes the only way to preserve the forest for the next generation (Banerjee, et al., 1997 in Nurrochmat, 2005b).

From the description as mentioned above, there is a question of how the pattern of the division of authority on forestry since centralized and decentralized model of forest management both equally lead to deforestation and social conflict? This paper attempts to put the division of authority for each stake holders of the central government, local government and communities, to their respective capacities in proportional collaboration to manage forestry affair to achieve forest sustainability.

2. METHODS

We did this research in Blora District, Central Java, Indonesia. In this qualitative research, we decided to observe and did deep interview with certain informants from stakeholder involved in Java forest management. We choose key informants from Central Government especially from Ministry of Domestic Affair as leader of division power regulation, Ministry of Environmental and Forestry as leader in forestry, and Perum Perhutani, a state own forestry company, which manage most of Java forest. We also collect information from Local Governments, both provincial level and district level, community which live in and surround forest, and other stakeholder related to forestry. We use interactive model (Miles, Huberman, and Saldana, 2014) for analyze data we collected. These data will triangulate with document, observation, and other informant.

3. RESULT AND FINDINGS

Some facts from this research that conducted in mid-year 2013 – 2015 related to forest management in Indonesia show that based on Law Number 23 of 2014, forestry affair as concurrent affair handled by Central and provincial government. But in Java except Jakarta, Yogyakarta and conservation forests, the management of state forest delegated to Perum Perhutani in accordance with Government Regulation Number 72 of 2010. Local government does not have the authority to manage state forest except for TAHURA (Taman Hutan Raya / forest park) as Law Number 23 of 2014.

From local government perspective, the delegation of authority to Perum Perhutani that rule out local government role in forest management shows that central government still does not have find best form to decentralize forestry affair. During our research, we found ridiculous fact while local government set the strategic issues regarding state-forest management, but do not have any authority to handle it. Local government raised issues about bare land on forest, without any action to solve it because they don't have authority on it. Likewise, when local government raised the issue of strengthening the forest area where the conflict with public related to tenure issues often arise, they also did not have any authority to solve it.

These limited authority that devoluted to local government, basically base on suspicions and doubt about local government capabilities as similar to what Teye (2011) found in Ghana. Central government should also be realize whether the failure of the implementation of decentralization of forestry in Indonesia, especially outside Java Island, are driven by mass euphoria when the access to forest resources opened from severe limited on previous (McCarthy, 2004; Arnold, LL, 2008). Government should examine the division of authority base on a comprehensive study in advantages and disadvantages each area both district and province. Distribution of affairs to local government cannot be based on the suspicions and doubts about the capabilities of them. As we refer to the spirit of Law Number 32 of 2004 and Number 23 of 2014 that promote widest autonomy for local government, the Central government should undertake a mapping of Districts or Province that have adequate power and resources to conduct an affair. The mechanism to control those implementations can be built to maintain its accountability. Local governments require authority of government affairs which emphasizes the role of the local communities on public sector (Supriyono, 2010).

While central government still has doubt about local government capabilities to govern forestry affair, government of Blora District shows success story in encouraging the development of community forest. Their capability to initiate, facilitate and foster private forest owners to manage the private forest well enough until gain recognition as a Sustainable Forest Management using LEI's (Indonesian Ecolabel Institution) scheme should become consideration of the Central government to give better assessment portion in division of authority in forestry affair. Local capabilities can be seen in the implementation of forestry affair by Blora district, especially in terms of private forests. The development of private forest with all its functions reaches 18,015 hectares in 2015. Although the development of private forests for the local communities are using the state budget through National Movement for Forest and Land Rehabilitation (GNRHL), development of these private forest have been managed well and show the capabilities of the

District in implementing forest affairs. Certificate of sustainable of forest management obtained by communities in Plantungan village, also shows the capabilities of the local people and institutions.

The other evident that show the capability of local government to manage forestry affair which has been decentralized even for limited authority, is how they encourage and establish protected areas to enhance the ecological functions of various forested area, both private and state forests. In the private forests area, government of Blora District set thirty thousand hectares for area that protected or need to protect, such as river banks, water reservoir, water catchment areas, and natural disaster prone areas. These protections are reinforced by issuance Local Regulation Number 18 of 2011 on Spatial Planning for Blora District.

But for a protected areas located in state forest, local government can't designate an area as a protected area. They can only do coordination and encourage Perum Perhutani and Ministry of Environment and Forestry, and support them in state forest protection. Blora district has two nature preservations which directly manage by Ministry of Environment and Forestry and several protected areas as high conservation value of forest (HCVF) which are managed by Perum Perhutani.

Referring to the nature of forest externalities, mainly on ecological function of forest, Beder (2006) give six principles that can be used for policy making. These principles like; sustainability principle, the polluter pays principle, precautionary principle, participation principle, equity principle, and human right principle, can be applied on the division of authority especially on forestry affair. As we know, forests have limitations, so its use requires arrangement in accordance to its carrying capacity in succession and reformation as renewable processes. The polluter pays principle consider how the state or other area or region that produce pollution funding to wooded areas in supporting the preservation of the environment, water resources, and climate that they enjoy. This principle can be used in relations between state and regions. However, it has not been yet studied in intergovernmental relationship between regions and between the central and local government. The other principle, especially in participation principle, requires high involvement of communities in forest management. In a large area with a growing population, participation becomes the only way to preserve the forest for its sustainability (Banerjee et al., 1997 in Nurrochmat, 2005b).

One of our informants, a professor in social forestry, said that if people or communities who live in and surround the forest see their neighborhood forest are exploited by others while they didn't get any economic benefit from those resources, they would be more reactive (interview, 16 September 2014). They will tend to force to take an action in order to protect their access to the forest with or without regard to sustainability. This is proven by massive looting in the Java forest in 1998 – 2002.

According to community leaders and informants from the local government, the ignoring of the right of community to access forest resources for their living will only add to the long list of conflicts and pressures on forest resources itself. In their traditional perspective, humans have been outlined and get a mandate from God to manage nature. It is the duty of humans to manage those natures appropriate with its ability. However, for some other people who have proved that the improvement of environmental conditions with the number of trees planted increases the number of springs in the region. Forests are not only a source of livelihood in term of economic income, but a source of life as sources of oxygen, water storage, and soil and climates guards.

Even if some people have an exploitative view, some researchers still have a lot of hope on decentralization of forestry affair that is expected to lead the way to solve deforestation and forest degradation. Through decentralization of forestry affair, the affection and concern for forest sustainability will increase, the democratic and participation principles will grow, creating equity and justice, and local development will give more attention on local potential and diversities.

Decentralization of forest resources is recommended in many places. According to the World Resources Institute, at least 60 countries have decentralized their management of natural resources (Ribot, 2002). Those transfers of power and authority significantly from central to local government show the reflection of spirit to build good forest governance through accountability, transparency, rule of law and public participation (Tambunan, 2000 in Yasmi, et al., 2005; Upadhyay, 2006; Tuomasjukka, 2010).

Some of our informants from local government said they want to share with Perum Perhutani in forest production management. They expect the government to trust their capabilities to manage forest production, from planting to harvesting, including forest protections. Local government's concern to the

social aspect of forest will increase when access to those forests have widely opened. However, we cannot justify this desire if local government and communities only want to get economic benefit of the forest. Both central and local government should maintain sustainability of the ecological functions of the forest. Indeed, the implementation of the decentralization of forestry affair in Indonesia has not run perfectly. The decentralization has not reached the goal of good forest governance. But we should know at that time, the political situation around the decentralization process was still follow the legacy of New Order era (McCarthy, 2004).

However, through decentralization of forestry affair, it is expected to reduce management cost and keep the income distribution over the forest resources evenly to various regions. Decentralization over natural resources will give local people a greater sense of belonging over the resources, thus will increase their willingness to manage the forest sustainably (Larson, 2002 in Teye, 2011). Decentralization of forestry affair should be able to improve forest conditions in short time. Through this policy, forest management can provide better benefit to the communities on the base on ecosystem preservation and developing capacity of local governments (Fisher, 2000 in Suharjito, 2009). Decentralization of forestry affair to local government will run well and meet the expectations when there is a spirit to reform the existing pattern of forest management into good forest governance.

There are several important points for decentralization of forest and nature resources (Andersson, 2006). Those points are: 1) the basic premise of successful decentralized management is cost effectiveness of information, time and places comparing to the centralized one; 2) most of researchers agree to the positive impact of decentralization of natural resources, local government is believed more accountable to natural resources users; 3) the success of decentralization of natural resources management depends on the technical capacity of local units whom received the decentralized authorities and responsibilities; 4) without adequate funding, the local government cannot do much in management of natural resources.

In the case of delegation of authority on forestry affair in Java, several things that Central Government has to consider are: the limitations of the decentralized authority; balance between responsibilities, duties, and the authorities; willingness to receive kickback from local authorities; confidence in the local government entrusted with the authorities without leave tight monitoring and controlling in the implementation of decentralized authorities (Ekawati, 2007). Local government and communities in Java, with the support of other stakeholders, need be trusted in forest management. Decentralization of forestry affair in Java, especially in production and limited production forests, will make benefit of the forest products can be accessed directly by local communities. Decentralization of conservation and protection forest will make local government and communities directly involve by joining in forest security patrol, arranging the buffer zone and doing social approach in the protected area.

As stated by Agrawal and Ostrom (2007) in his book, centralized management of natural resources is rarely successful. Local communities who depend on the forest even become enemies in this forest management policy. It tends to corrupt, over-exploited, and repressive to local communities. These are the reason why natural resources should be decentralized. But, the same reason is also used by Central Government to pullback some authorities decentralized on forestry affair. This "partial recentralization" is embodied in Law Number 23 of 2014 on Regional Government. The government through Ministry of Environment and Forestry consider that decentralizing the authority of forestry affair on district level of government will encourage the over-exploitation and causing ecological disturbance.

But, forest management pattern which is involving local communities will create stronger sense of belonging of the public on the natural resources. This is expected to turn the concern to the sustainability of forest higher than before. That statement is in line with positive relation between decentralization of forest affair with efficiency (Balaquer-Coll, 2009). Decentralization of forestry can also be an effective instrument to improve the efficiency and income (Chen and Groenewold, 2011) and shortening the distance of authority holders with communities (Cheema and Rondinelli, 2007). Furthermore, if local government and institutions have limitation to implement the given authorities, the Central Government should strengthen the institutional capacity and oversees its implementation.

By giving the authority, the local government access to society's welfare will much better. Besides that, the implementation of decentralized authority also more accountable than centralized one. The closer government to the communities, the better it will work (Stigler, 1957 in Shah [Ed], 2006). Public has right to determine the type and quantity of public services they need. But in the case of forestry, is also realized that

the capacity of local government and communities need to be improved. People need wider access to forest products, forest area, and proper empowerment.

Perum Perhutani has also attempted empowerment of forest communities through community base forest management (CBFM). This program is intended to accommodate communities' desire to involve and get benefit from forest exploitation in the region. According to the Decree of Chief of Executive Officer of Perum Perhutani Number 682/KPTS/Dir/2009 on Pengelolaan Hutan Bersama Masyarakat (Community based forest management), this program is expected to be a forest management system that gives people an opportunity to participate, with the sharing spirit and working together in forest management. Perum Perhutani initiated to form Lembaga Masyarakat Desa Hutan (forest village communities institution) as institution who formally cooperate with them in partnership principle. LMDH expected to be equal partners and make agreements with Perum Perhutani in forest management. Perum Perhutani tried to use participatory and dialogue approaches in this community empowerment.

But those just in applied in normative level only. This CBFM is top-down program and uniformly applied in all state forest managed by Perum Perhutani. In our interview with community leader, they said that they are not involved in forest management planning. They are involved in forest protection, planting and harvesting. And even then they are only as a labor in which regulated by employee of Perum Perhutani. There is no participatory and dialogue approaches with the community as told above. There are still doubts to the ability and capability of the communities and the people to contribute in forest management run by Perum Perhutani. This is also shown in fact that found by Maryudi and Krott (2012) on Menoreh Hill. This lack of trust from both sides made PHBM not run as expected.

But we have to realize that we need to prepare the system and resources in order to have comprehensive forest management. Even decentralized environmental management had a positive impact by ensuring the participation of the local communities, its success depend on the accountability and the capacity of local units who received the authority (Andersson, 2006). Without sufficient funding, local government and communities can only do little. The regulation, supervision and monitoring should improve in order to avoid wrong implementation on decentralization of forestry as happen in outer islands of Java during decentralization process. In fact, deforestation in forest outsidess java occurred long before the decentralization of forest management policies implemented.

Deforestation is driven by corrupted political and economic systems, which place forest as just a source of revenue that could be exploited for political interest groups and personal gain (Barber and Schewithelm, 2000). This is become a confirmation that the unsuccessful story of the decentralization of forestry after Reformation Era in Indonesia, cannot be used as justification to perform partial recentralization on forestry affair. Decentralization is not the main cause of deforestation in Indonesia.

As we know, before Law Number 23 of 2014 on Local Government applied, the local government has small authorities. Large authorities such as provision of license of the conversion of forests into oil palm plantation, one million hectares of peat land clearing for paddy field, forest clearing for open mining, and misuse of timber cutting permits in the development of HTI (Industrial Plantation Forest) are the largest contributor to the deforestation in Indonesia. In addition, several plantation companies often set of fire to do land clearing, which this is the main source of catastrophic forest fires in this country. All those conversion policies are belongs to Central Government domain, even when the decentralization of forestry affair carried out in the political reform in Indonesia after 1998. During that political reform, each districts have different perceive in addressing the policy. Local government and communities responded the decentralization policy in accordance with the incentives they got and the level of their dependence on the forests (Yonariza and Shivakoti, 2007).

Being related with decentralization theory as Smith (1985) said, the transfer of power and authority from Central to local government still needs supervisions. This will prevent local subjectivity in policy making, set out steps needed if a program cannot be implemented, and keep the program accountable. Local government hopes to have bigger authorities in forestry affair in Java as our informants said are not excessive. They want balance relationship in their intergovernmental relationship with Central government in forest management.

In this balance center relationship, the decentralized authorities become more effective through strengthening and adjustment of local government institutions so that the structures, resources, and responsibilities adequate to providing public services and democratic functions. The inter governmental

relationship between central and local government have partnership function for the society welfare, which central government support technically, assessment, and financially. The relationship between them is expected to be collaboration because one cannot replace the other but need each other (Muttalib and Khan, 1982). The government should have no doubt to local government and communities in their capabilities in forest management.

However, we have to remember that the policy of decentralization of forestry affair still must consider ecological condition of every forest, economic pressure, local communities' traditions, and everything that support the performance of the forest management to achieve the policies' targets (Webb and Shivakoti [Eds.], 2007). In other hand, the local government and communities' desire to have absolute authorities on natural resources cannot be justified. Central government still can determine which and to whom the authority can be delegated without threatening environmental sustainability (Colfer, CJP and Capistrano, 2006).

We believe that, cooperation in the form of "balance collaboration" which refers to balance centered relationship (Muttalib and Khan, 1982) need to promote and develop in division of authority of forestry affair to stakeholders proportionally. For production forests, we can try to distribute the authority of producing forest products such as timber, gums, resins and all its' derivative to Perum Perhutani and local government rather than to Perum Perhutani alone and neglect the local government. They can cooperate and give benefits for each other. Local government can take social role of Perum Perhutani in achieving local communities' welfare, which can reduce pressure on production forests. In protected forests, local government can help Perum Perhutani by providing assessment and material support if Central government gives the assignment to protect the forests.

In addition, this "balance collaboration" can also be done by providing access to local communities, local government own enterprises and local government to cooperate with Perum Perhutani in forest management equally. This collaboration enhances the role of the communities to determine what kind of species decided as main plant, filler plants, boundary plants and hedgerows planted in forest to optimize the income of the local communities, local government and Perum Perhutani. By using this balance collaboration, all stakeholders will sit together to participate and get benefits of those forest managements in economic, social and ecological aspects. Thus, the communities' welfare will increase, the forests more sustainable, and in the end the values of the forest as life support can be maintained.

To achieve this, the Central government needs to open space for dialogue with local government and communities related to forestry affair authority that should devolved. Regulatory changes relating to the authority in forestry affair will become as devices that help to implement it. The government also needs to do a mapping of local capabilities in managing the forestry affair. The simple benchmark as early indicator of the local capabilities is how progress and achievement of the local governments in management of private forest, city forest, and forest park in its territory. Meanwhile, the local government and communities still have to prioritize the strengthening the institutions, improving the technical capabilities of forest management, as well as the increase of awareness of the ecological functions of forest in the regions.

4. CONCLUSION

In the decentralization of forestry affair must consider how the roles of each stakeholder in implementing sustainable forest management. The transfer of authority in forestry to one level of government and exclude the other stakeholders will not only obstruct the preservation of forest, but instead encourage the deforestation and forest degradation. Indifference and neglect of local government and communities which has become forefront of the forest management will make the benefit of forest management for the greatest prosperity of people as mandated in the constitution of Indonesia is difficult to be realized.

By considering the principle of externality and efficiency as issued in Law 23 of 2014 on Regional Government, Central Government shut off the participation of the local government and communities in sustainable forest management. Through this law, the local government's function for monitoring, evaluation, supervision, and supporting the implementation of forestry affair lost by the withdrawal of those authority to higher level of local government. The hope of local government, especially Blora District, to play an active role in equal position with Central government as Muttalib and Khan (1982) present to be balance center relationship become lost.

Current forest management constraint can be eliminated or at least be reduced through increase participation by respective stakeholder; particularly those who live surrounding the forest so the human resources, zero sense of belonging and financial constraint are reduced. This balance collaboration among stakeholders in forestry affair will encourage sustainable forest management in Java if there regulatory changes in order to accommodate local participation to directly involve in sustainable forest management by avoiding deforestation and forest degradations. Local commodities should allow take benefit from surrounding forest while carrying their obligation to preserve forest sustainable.

Balance centered relationship need to be promoted and developed in form of devolution of proportional authorities on forestry to all stakeholders as balance collaboration. This balance collaboration can be formed as Business to Business (Perum Perhutani with Local Government Enterprises), Business to Community (Perum Perhutani with villagers), or Business to Government (Perum Perhutani with District of Local Government). Perum Perhutani as state own company has to make profit and share it to local community and government. Instead, local government took over social role of Perum Perhutani to improve communities' welfare that lives in and near forest. This will reduce social pressure to the sustainability of forest. Besides that, local government can support Perum Perhutani to manage the conservation and protected areas in its territory.

This balance collaboration also can be done by providing access to local government and communities to cooperate with Perum Perhutani equally. The role of communities and local government enhance by involving them to choose what kind of species for main products, plant filler, boundary crops, and hedgerows, which will be planted in the forests to optimize stakeholders' revenue.

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